Negative Self-Referent Thinking is Less Sensitive to Aversive Outcomes in People with Higher Levels of Depressive Symptoms by Lijima, Y et al.
Running head: STUTTERING THOUGHTS                                      1 
 1 
Stuttering Thoughts: Negative Self-Referent Thinking is Less Sensitive to Aversive Outcomes  2 
in People with Higher Levels of Depressive Symptoms 3 
 4 
Yudai Iijima
a
*, Keisuke Takano
b
*, Yannick Boddez
b
, Filip Raes
b, 
and Yoshihiko Tanno
c
 5 
 6 
a
 Graduate School of Education, University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 7 
113-0033, Japan 8 
b
 Center for Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 9 
102, Leuven 3000, Belgium. 10 
c 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, Komaba 3-8-1, Meguro-ku, 11 
Tokyo 153-8902, Japan. 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Keisuke Takano, Center for 16 
Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, Leuven 17 
3000, Belgium. Phone: +32163 26001. Fax: +32163 26099. e-mail: 18 
Keisuke.Takano@kuleuven.be. 19 
* These authors equally contributed to this work; co-first authorship. 20 
  21 
STUTTERING THOUGHTS                                                 2 
 
Abstract 1 
Learning theories of depression have proposed that depressive cognitions, such as negative 2 
thoughts with reference to oneself, can develop through a reinforcement learning mechanism. 3 
This negative self-reference is considered to be positively reinforced by rewarding 4 
experiences such as genuine support from others after negative self-disclosure, and negatively 5 
reinforced by avoidance of potential aversive situations. The learning account additionally 6 
predicts that negative self-reference would be maintained by an inability to adjust one’s 7 
behavior when negative self-reference no longer leads to such reward. To test this prediction, 8 
we designed an adapted version of the reversal-learning task. In this task, participants were 9 
reinforced to choose and engage in either negative or positive self-reference by probabilistic 10 
economic reward and punishment. Although participants were initially trained to choose 11 
negative self-reference, the stimulus-reward contingencies were reversed to prompt a shift 12 
toward positive self-reference (Study 1) and a further shift toward negative self-reference 13 
(Study 2). Model-based computational analyses showed that depressive symptoms were 14 
associated with a low learning rate of negative self-reference, indicating a high level of 15 
reward expectancy for negative self-reference even after the contingency reversal. 16 
Furthermore, the difficulty in updating outcome predictions of negative self-reference was 17 
significantly associated with the extent to which one possesses negative self-images. These 18 
results suggest that difficulty in adjusting action-outcome estimates for negative self-reference 19 
increases the chance to be faced with negative aspects of self, which may result in depressive 20 
symptoms. 21 
Keywords: self-reference, depression, reinforcement learning, Q-learning model, 22 
rumination  23 
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Stuttering Thoughts: Negative Self-Referent Thinking is Less Sensitive to Aversive 1 
Outcomes in People with Higher Levels of Depressive Symptoms 2 
Introduction 3 
Four decades of studies have shown that individuals with clinical and subclinical 4 
depressive symptoms have a negativity bias in self-referent information processing. Cognitive 5 
models of depression have highlighted the negative views of the self, the world, and the future 6 
as the cognitive triad of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ingram, 1990). Dysfunctions in 7 
self-referent information processing have gained particular attention in social and clinical 8 
psychology, as early studies demonstrated that an excessive degree of self-focused attention is 9 
correlated with increased levels of depressive symptoms (e.g., Smith & Greenberg, 1981; 10 
Ingram & Smith, 1984). More recent studies have confirmed that negative automatic thoughts 11 
and biases in attention, interpretation, and memory are associated with depression (Gotlib & 12 
Joormann, 2010; LeMoult, Kircanski, Prasad, & Gotlib, 2016; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), 13 
particularly when the stimuli are self-relevant or processed in a self-relevant manner (e.g., 14 
Joormann & Tran, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 15 
Other studies have suggested that individuals with depressive symptoms tend to lack 16 
a positivity bias that non-depressed individuals have; although people generally tend to 17 
attribute positive (rather than negative) matters to internal, stable, and global factors, this 18 
tendency is weak or absent in people with depressive symptoms (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, 19 
& Hankin, 2004). The positivity bias could function protectively to divert attention away from 20 
negative information and to direct it to positive information; therefore shielding people from 21 
negative self-referent processing and preserving positive self-views (Gotlib, McLachlan, & 22 
Katz, 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000). Excessive focus on 23 
negative aspects of the self (i.e., negative self-referent processing) and lack of focus on its 24 
positive aspects is associated with unbalanced accessibility of negative and positive 25 
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self-referent materials, thereby contributing to depressive rumination (e.g., Trew, 2011). 1 
Despite a large number of studies that have investigated the altered emotional 2 
self-referent processing in depression, the mechanisms underlying the self-negativity biases 3 
and the absence of self-positivity biases are still subjects of ongoing debate. How should we 4 
understand these biases? One important aspect, and the focus of the current study, is the 5 
inflexibility in adjusting cognition and behavior to a changing environment. Previous studies 6 
have suggested that individuals with depressive symptoms tend to have difficulty refreshing 7 
working memory by eliminating information that is no longer relevant (Joormann & Gotlib, 8 
2008; Levens & Gotlib, 2010; Pe, Brose, Gotlib, & Kuppens, in press), inhibiting negative 9 
information processing (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Joormann, 2004), and 10 
disengaging current attention from negative stimuli (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Frank, & 11 
Crombez, 2005; Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Such 12 
cognitive inflexibility in updating attention and memory explains why people with depressive 13 
symptoms experience difficulty in stopping their negative self-referent thinking. 14 
The updating function has also been examined from a learning perspective, 15 
suggesting that the inability to update a current belief on action-outcome contingencies is 16 
associated with heightened levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms. If individuals with 17 
high levels of depressive symptoms are provided with inaccurate instructions about how to 18 
succeed at a learning task, they showed persistent and problematic rule-following behaviors 19 
throughout the task (McAuliffe, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). Similarly, trait anxiety is 20 
associated with the inability to update action-outcome estimates following unexpected 21 
aversive outcomes (Browning et al., 2015). These findings suggest that individuals with 22 
depression (and anxiety) symptoms have difficulty in adjusting their beliefs in a volatile 23 
environment (where the outcomes are not static but are changeable) once these beliefs have 24 
been learned and established. Such inflexibility in updating beliefs or action-outcome 25 
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predictions could well explain the development and maintenance processes of self-negativity 1 
bias in depression, since it is possible that (a) negative self-referent thinking is learned and 2 
reinforced, and that (b) negative self-reference is persistently perceived to be accompanied 3 
with reward even after environmental changes. 4 
Indeed, the learning theory of depression suggests that the development of depressive 5 
cognitions can be explained by reinforcement learning principles (Ramnerö, Folke, & Kanter 6 
2015; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). More precisely, this account holds that the 7 
repeated presentation of reward after a negative thought will increase the frequency of such 8 
negative thoughts. Although negative self-referent thinking has clear adverse consequences, 9 
such as increasing negative affect, negative self-reference can be perceived to have beneficial 10 
outcomes that function as rewards in specific contexts. For example, complaining and 11 
expressing negative aspects of the self may be initially reinforced by the genuine support and 12 
concern of other people (e.g., Ramnerö et al., 2015), even if excessive disclosure about 13 
negative aspects of the self might cause fatigue and social rejection by others in a long-term 14 
relationship (Coyne, 1976). Self-focused thinking may also be perceived as a means to 15 
enhance self-knowledge and to generate possible solutions in difficult situations. In line with 16 
this, self-reflection may indeed help understand oneself and analyze problems accurately (e.g., 17 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Watkins, 2008).  18 
In addition to positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement might also play an 19 
important role in the development of self-negativity bias in depression. It has been argued that 20 
depressive rumination (a repetitive and persistent form of negative self-focused thinking) 21 
functions as an act of avoidance, which can temporally reduce emotional distresses by 22 
preventing even more aversive situations and the responsibility to take action 23 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins & Noken-Hoekseam, 2014). 24 
However, such avoidance also prevents actual problem-solving and the opportunity to 25 
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experience that certain situations may actually be not so aversive or even rewarding, thereby 1 
sometimes contributing to the depressed state in the long-term (Jacobson, Martell, & 2 
Dimidjian, 2001; Ramnerö et al., 2015).  3 
Models of reinforcement learning propose that the efficiency of the updating function 4 
can be represented by a parameter that quantifies the learning rate. In the 5 
reinforcement-learning framework, an agent (a) predicts reward values of action candidates 6 
(e.g., pressing a right vs. a left key), (b) selects an action that maximizes the predicted reward 7 
value (e.g., amount of juice or money), and (c) updates the predictions according to the 8 
consequences of the action (e.g., Corrado & Doya, 2007; Daw & Doya, 2006; O’Doherty, 9 
Hampton, & Kim, 2007). Learning progresses through minimizing the mismatch between the 10 
actual and predicted outcomes of an action (i.e., prediction error) and maximizing the 11 
predicted value that is associated with the current action. In other words, the current 12 
action-outcome estimate is determined by the previous prediction error, which is weighted by 13 
a learning rate that varies depending on individual and environmental factors. The learning 14 
rate becomes smaller when an agent is less sensitive to environmental changes, that is, when 15 
the agent’s action-outcome estimates are more slowly updated. In the present study, we 16 
hypothesized that individuals with depressive symptoms would have a low learning rate for 17 
negative self-reference. A low learning rate represents difficulty in discarding the learned 18 
beliefs that negative self-reference brings beneficial outcomes even when the actual outcomes 19 
are harmful. Such inflexible adjustment in action-outcome predictions would contribute to the 20 
excessive use of negative self-reference. 21 
Therefore, we designed a laboratory model that allowed studying the development 22 
and maintenance of the self-negativity bias. More specifically, we examined the relationship 23 
between individual differences in depressive symptoms and the learning of associations 24 
between emotional self-reference and related rewards by using an adapted version of the 25 
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probabilistic reversal learning (RL) task. In a typical RL task, participants are offered two 1 
options, one associated with higher probability of reward and the other associated with higher 2 
probability of punishment. Over the course of training, participants learn which response 3 
instrumentally generates a reward (Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012). However, in the middle of the 4 
task, the stimulus-reward contingencies are reversed. As the trained response no longer results 5 
in a reward, participants have to discount the outcome prediction of the option that was 6 
initially a “correct” response and have to switch to the other response. 7 
In our adapted version of the RL task, participants were offered two emotional 8 
(negative vs. positive) options. Depending on their choice, participants were expected to 9 
engage in negative or positive self-reference (Figure 1). More precisely, participants were 10 
presented with a self-attribute that had the same valence as their choice, and were asked to 11 
rate to what extent the self-attribute was applicable to them (Takano, Iijima, Sakamoto, Raes, 12 
& Tanno, 2015; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). For example, if a participant chose the “positive” 13 
option, they had to rate the applicability of a positive attribute (e.g., “Happy”). Immediately 14 
after the rating, either a reward or punishment was presented probabilistically, depending on 15 
the participant’s valence choice. In the acquisition phase, participants learned that the 16 
“negative” option was more likely to generate a reward than the “positive” counterpart; 17 
however, in the reversal phase, the “negative” option was no longer the correct response, and 18 
was more likely to be followed by punishment. To perform this task well, participants had to 19 
update the outcome prediction of negative self-reference efficiently after the contingency 20 
reversal. As described above, we predicted that depressive symptoms would be associated 21 
with a significant delay in updating the outcome prediction of negative self-reference.  22 
This hypothesis was tested in two studies using the emotional RL task. In Study 1, 23 
participants were initially trained to choose negative self-reference (acquisition phase), 24 
following which, they were to choose positive self-reference to obtain reward (reversal phase). 25 
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This task allowed us to examine the process of discounting the reward prediction of negative 1 
self-reference in the reversal phase. However, because Study 1 did not cover the transition 2 
from positive to negative self-reference, we could not examine the re-learning process of 3 
negative-reward associations (i.e., increasing the reward prediction of negative self-reference). 4 
This was particularly important for individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms, 5 
who were expected to have greater preference toward negative self-reference already during 6 
initial trials of the acquisition phase. Therefore, in Study 2, we added the second reversal 7 
phase, in which participants were trained to choose negative self-reference again after being 8 
trained to choose positive self-reference. 9 
As an additional hypothesis, we tested the mediational role of self-image in the 10 
association between the updating of reward prediction and the level of depressive symptoms. 11 
We predicted that difficulty in updating reward prediction for negative self-reference would 12 
be associated with more negative self-images (e.g., because persistently collecting and 13 
therefore being exposed to negative self-referent information leads to negative self-views 14 
and/or decreases positive self-views) and that the reinforced negative self-views may 15 
contribute to depressive symptoms. More precisely, we hypothesized that the association 16 
between the low learning rate for negative self-reference and depressive symptoms would be 17 
mediated by a more negative (and less positive) self-image (i.e., by a higher applicability 18 
rating score for negative attributes and a lower score for positive attributes during the 19 
emotional RL task). 20 
Study 1 21 
Method 22 
Participants. Thirty-nine participants (16 men and 23 women; mean age = 19.6 23 
years, SD = 2.8 years) were recruited from a large sample pool of undergraduate students 24 
from the University of Tokyo. No specific inclusion / exclusion criteria were used. 25 
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Measure. Participants completed the Japanese version of the Center for 1 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; Shima, Shikano, Kitamura, 2 
& Asai, 1985), which is a 20-item self-report questionnaire that measures the levels of 3 
depressive symptoms during the previous week. Each item describes a typical symptom of 4 
depression and is rated on a 4-point scale of the frequency of occurrence ranging from 0 (less 5 
than 1 day) to 3 (5–7 days). The mean CES-D score was 11.9 (SD = 7.9) and the Cronbach’s α 6 
was .88. Ten participants had clinically significant levels of symptoms, which exceeded the 7 
cut-off score of the CES-D (> 15; Radloff, 1977).  8 
The baseline task. Before performing the emotional and neutral RL tasks, 9 
participants completed a baseline task (Figure 1A) to assess the preference for negative 10 
self-reference that participants originally had. In this task, participants were presented with a 11 
positive and a negative valence option. They were asked to choose either of the two options, 12 
following which an attribute corresponding to the selected valence was displayed (if the 13 
“positive” option was selected, an attribute, such as “Happy,” was presented). Participants 14 
were instructed to rate the extent to which the presented attribute was applicable to them on a 15 
5-point scale ranging from (1) not at all to (5) very much. Therefore, if a participant preferred 16 
negative self-reference, he/she would choose the “negative” option more frequently than the 17 
“positive” option. When making the preference choices, participants were informed only of 18 
the valence types (i.e., “Negative” vs. “Positive”), but the specific content of the attributes 19 
(e.g., “Unhappy” vs. “Happy”) was blinded until the attribute-rating display appeared. 20 
Participants completed 20 trials in the baseline task.  21 
We used a list of negative and positive attributes, a subset of which was used in a 22 
previous study (Takano et al., 2015). The list comprised 100 pairs of negative and positive 23 
attributes that produce bipolar sets of traits (e.g., happy vs. unhappy, arrogant vs. humble, 24 
frequently having troubles with family members vs. having a good relationship with family 25 
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members)
1
. The length of stimuli between the negative and positive counterparts was matched, 1 
but it was not controlled within negative (or positive) materials. This is because (a) we 2 
adopted the items from existing questionnaires of personality, depression, anxiety, and social 3 
functioning (see Takano et al., 2015), and (b) there should be no or little influence of stimulus 4 
length given that we did not impose a strict response time window. In each trial, one of the 5 
attributes was randomly selected. Among the 100 pairs, 20 were used in the baseline task, and 6 
the other 80 pairs were used in the following emotional RL task. All attributes had been 7 
confirmed to have negative or positive valence by two psychological researchers who were 8 
unaware of the aim of the present study. 9 
The emotional reversal learning (RL) task. Similar to the baseline task, 10 
participants were asked to choose either the negative or positive valence option in each trial. 11 
Depending on the participants’ valence choice, a positive or negative attribute was displayed. 12 
Participants rated to what extent the displayed attribute was applicable to them using a 5-point 13 
Likert scale as in the baseline task. After the rating, feedback of reward (+ 5 JPY) or 14 
punishment (- 5 JPY) was displayed probabilistically, depending on the valence choice (1 JPY 15 
= 0.01 USD). The task consisted of 80 trials; the first 40 trials were the acquisition phase, in 16 
which the “negative” option was more associated with reward than with punishment (at a 17 
80:20 % probability); the latter half was the reversal phase, in which the “negative” option 18 
was more associated with punishment than with reward (at a 20:80 % probability; Figure 2A). 19 
The “positive” option had the opposite reinforcement schedule; the probabilities of reward 20 
and punishment were 20:80 % in the acquisition and 80:20 % in the reversal phase. Before 21 
starting this task, participants were informed that: (a) they would be paid the total amount of 22 
money acquired during the task; (b) the reward and punishment were determined by the 23 
                                                   
1
 These attributes were presented in the form of a phrase or sentence. Because of the language differences, 
the examples are shown as if they were a single-word stimuli; however, for example, the stimulus “happy”, 
was more like “(I) am happy” in the original (Japanese) form. The full list of the stimuli is available on 
request from the corresponding author. 
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valence choice but not by the attribute rating
2
; (c) either the negative or positive valence 1 
option is more likely to be associated with reward than punishment (and vice versa); and (d) 2 
the contingency would be changed during the experiment, although the timing and the number 3 
of the changes were not mentioned. Participants were not explicitly instructed to maximize 4 
the total amount of reward. 5 
The neutral reversal learning (RL) task. To assess and control the general learning 6 
(and value updating) ability, we administered the neutral RT task with non-emotional and 7 
non-self-referent stimuli. Participants chose between the letters A and B, which was 8 
probabilistically rewarded and punished as per the same reinforcement schedule that was used 9 
in the emotional RL task. This neutral task also consisted of 80 trials; the first half was the 10 
acquisition phase, in which the “B” option was more associated with reward than was the “A” 11 
option; the latter half was the reversal phase, in which the “A” option was more associated 12 
with reward than was the “B” option. Participants were informed that (a) they would be paid 13 
the total amount of money that they acquired in this task and in the emotional RL task, and 14 
that (b) the reward-punishment feedback is probabilistically determined by the A-B choice. As 15 
in the emotional RL task, they were not explicitly instructed to maximize the total amount of 16 
reward.  17 
Procedure. Participants were invited to the laboratory individually. On arrival, they 18 
provided written informed consent. First, participants completed the baseline task, following 19 
which they completed the emotional and neutral RL tasks. The order of the emotional and 20 
neutral RL tasks was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, the participants completed 21 
a self-report questionnaire to measure depressive symptoms, and were debriefed and paid the 22 
amount of money acquired during the RL tasks. All study protocols were approved by the 23 
Ethical Committee for Experimental Research on Human Subjects of the University of Tokyo.  24 
                                                   
2
 Providing reward/punishment feedback according to the applicability rating would make the rating scores 
less reliable. If reward was provided only for an “applicable” response, participants would be motivated to 
make the “applicable” response even when the presented attribute is not applicable to them.  
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Statistical analyses. We employed the Q-learning model (Watkins & Dayan, 1992; 1 
Sutton & Barto, 1998) to extract specific features (i.e., learning rate) of the participants’ 2 
individual learning processes in the reversal learning tasks. The Q-learning model assumes 3 
that the participants’ choice behavior is determined by outcome predictions of choosing either 4 
of the two options (i.e., negative vs. positive self-references, in the emotional RL task; B and 5 
A in the neutral task). The outcome predictions are updated in each trial by the difference 6 
between the actual outcome (reward or punishment) and expected value of the chosen option, 7 
namely the prediction error of the Rescorla-Wagner rule. In our model of the emotional RL 8 
task, the updating processes of the outcome predictions were represented as follows: 9 
 10 
For trials in which negative self-reference was chosen: 11 
))()(()()1( tQtRtQtQ negnegnegneg    12 
For trials in which positive self-reference was chosen: 13 
))()(()()1( tQtRtQtQ pospospospos    14 
 15 
where Qneg (t + 1) and Qpos (t + 1) are the outcome predictions of the two choice options 16 
(negative and positive self-reference) at trial t + 1. These outcome predictions are determined 17 
by the prediction error represented by the difference between the actual reward, R(t), and the 18 
outcome prediction, Qneg(t) or Qpos(t) at the previous trial, t. Unlike the original Q-learning 19 
model, we assumed two learning rates (i.e., αneg and αpos) that may be different between the 20 
“negative” and “positive” options (double update model; cf. Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). 21 
Previous studies have proposed variants of the Q-learning model depending on the tasks and 22 
stimuli; for example, assuming different learning rates between rewarded and punished trials 23 
(e.g., Dombrovski et al., 2010) and between chosen and unchosen options (e.g., Li & Daw, 24 
2011; Schlagenhauf et al., 2014), and temporally variable learning rates over trials (Bai, 25 
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Katahira, & Ohira, 2014). The current assumption of the differential learning rates was 1 
motivated by the hypothesis that individuals with depressive symptoms would have difficulty 2 
in updating the outcome predictions, particularly for negative self-reference. A low learning 3 
rate of the “negative” option reflects a slow-down in updating the outcome prediction for 4 
negative self-reference because the prediction error at the previous trial has only a small 5 
influence on the current outcome prediction. Conversely, a high learning rate indicates that the 6 
outcome prediction changes easily in response to prediction error, which results in a quick 7 
switch between the two options after the contingency reversal. Importantly, under this 8 
assumption, outcome predictions were updated independently for negative and positive 9 
self-reference. Since each updating process is solely coded by the corresponding (either 10 
negative or positive) learning rate (and exploitation parameter), the learning trajectory of 11 
negative and positive self-reference can be described separately. Initial values of the Q 12 
parameters were determined by the proportions of “negative” and “positive” choices in the 13 
baseline task, which reflect the preference for negative or positive self-reference that each 14 
participant originally had. 15 
The probability of choosing the “negative” option at trial t is then represented by a 16 
sigmoid function of the difference in the outcome predictions between the negative and 17 
positive options:  18 
)))()((exp(1
1
)(
tQtQ
tP
posneg
neg



 19 
where β is an exploration-exploitation parameter, which reflects the reinforcement history, 20 
with a larger value indicating greater sensitivity to the Q difference between the two options. 21 
This Q-learning model was fitted to the observed choice behaviors of each 22 
participant individually. The optimal values of αneg, αpos and β were searched by the log 23 
maximum likelihood estimation, in which we calculated the log-sum of the probabilities that 24 
the model would select the option that the participant actually selected at trial t [P(choice t)]. 25 
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Thus, the log likelihood [log(L)] was presented as follows: 1 

t
tchoicePL ))(log()log(  2 
The log-likelihood was maximized by the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm of 3 
the R optim function under the “hard constraints” on the lower and upper limits of the 4 
parameter values (0 ≤ αneg, αpos ≤ 1; e.g., Daw, 2011).  5 
We fitted the same three-parameter Q-learning model to the choice behaviors 6 
observed in the neutral RL task. Although we did not expect any differences in the learning 7 
rates between the option B and A (αB and αA, corresponding to αneg and αpos), these parameters 8 
were separately estimated in order to compare the results of the neutral RL task with those of 9 
the emotional RL task. The initial values of the Q parameters were set to be zero, because 10 
there would be no clear pre-existing preferences to the neutral stimuli. It is to be noted that the 11 
learning parameters (i.e., learning rates and exploitation parameter) were not influenced by 12 
the order of the emotional and neutral RL tasks, ts < 1.39, ps > .17. 13 
Model Comparison. The goodness of fit of the models was tested by using the 14 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), presented as follows: 15 
kLAIC 2)log(2  , 16 
where k represents the number of free parameters. A smaller AIC value indicates a better 17 
model fit. The AIC prefers a parsimonious model because it includes a penalty term that 18 
increases as a function of the number of estimated parameters. We compared the AIC of the 19 
double update model (i.e., assuming αneg and αpos) to that of the single update model (i.e., 20 
assuming equal constraints on αneg and αpos) in order to verify that the double learning rates 21 
explain participants’ choice behaviors better than the single learning rate. However, it is not 22 
necessary that all participants have a smaller AIC for the double than the single update model. 23 
We expected that there would be individual differences in the balance of the learning rates of 24 
the negative and positive self-reference; some individuals would have equal levels of the 25 
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learning rates between the “negative” and “positive” options, whereas other individuals would 1 
have unbalanced learning rates (e.g., reduced learning rate specifically of the “negative” 2 
option). Table 1 shows the results of the model comparison. For approximately one-third of 3 
the participants, the double update model explained the data better than did the single update 4 
model, in terms of the AIC; however, for the other participants, the single learning rate was 5 
sufficient to explain their choice behaviors. Because the single update model is a lower model 6 
that is nested in the double update model, we performed the subsequent analyses based on the 7 
estimates of the double update model; that is, if depressive symptoms are associated with an 8 
impairment in a general updating ability (not specific for negative or positive self-reference), 9 
both the learning rates for negative and positive response options should be correlated with 10 
depressive symptoms.  11 
Sample size calculation. We determined sample sizes by power analysis (G*power; 12 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Our main analyses focused on multiple regressions 13 
predicting depressive symptoms by the six learning parameters from the emotional (αneg, αpos, 14 
and β) and neutral RL tasks (αB, αA, and β). According to the power analysis, a sample size of 15 
n = 26–55 is needed to detect a medium-to-large effect of a single regression coefficient (f2 = 16 
0.15-0.35) under the assumption of alpha = .05 and beta = .80. One previous study examined 17 
reinforcement learning in non-clinical depressed samples, showing a medium-to-large effect 18 
size for the difference in a learning parameter between high and low depression groups 19 
(Hedge’s g = 0.73; Kunisato et al., 2012). Based on this result, we set the sample sizes to be 20 
approximately 40–50, which enabled us to detect a medium-to-large effect. 21 
Results 22 
In the baseline task, wherein no feedback of reward and punishment was provided, 23 
individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms were more likely to choose negative 24 
self-reference (r = .31, p = .05). Those with higher levels of depressive symptoms rated the 25 
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negative attributes to be more applicable (r = .49, p < .01) and positive attributes to be less 1 
applicable to them (r = -.50, p < .01)
3
. These tendencies were also observed in the emotional 2 
RL task (r = .69, p < .01 for negative self-reference; r = -.38, p = .02 for positive 3 
self-reference). 4 
In the emotional RL task, all participants performed better than chance in the 5 
acquisition and reversal phases (Table 2). These results suggest that participants were 6 
successful at learning the initial association between negative self-reference and reward, and 7 
they could subsequently adapt their behavior to choose positive self-reference in accordance 8 
with the contingency reversal. As a possible strategy, participants could always rate negative 9 
attributes being “not at all” applicable to themselves in order to avoid negative self-reference 10 
(and could rate positive attributes as not being applicable to avoid positive self-reference). 11 
Therefore, we examined the frequency of the “not at all” response, which was only 10.3% 12 
across all trials in the task. Thus, participants retrieved the aspects of the self that 13 
corresponded to the displayed self-attributes in most (90%) of the trials. 14 
Model-based analyses showed that severity of depressive symptoms is negatively 15 
correlated with the learning rate of negative (i.e., αneg) but not of positive (i.e., αpos) 16 
self-reference (Figure 3). In order to examine the influences of the learning rate on the choice 17 
behavior and the outcome prediction across trials, we plotted the choice frequency and the 18 
mean outcome prediction of negative self-reference (i.e., Qneg) for individuals who had 19 
smaller and greater values (i.e., upper and lower quartiles) of the αneg parameter (Figure 4). 20 
Individuals with lower learning rates of negative self-reference showed a delayed shift from 21 
negative to positive self-reference after the stimulus-reward contingency reversal (i.e., at the 22 
40
th
 trial). The updating of the outcome prediction was also delayed for the individuals with 23 
low learning rates of negative self-reference; the outcome prediction of negative 24 
                                                   
3
 The data from five participants who always chose either the “negative” or “positive” option over the 
trials were not used in calculating these correlations. 
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self-reference did not reach zero (not even at the final trial).  1 
In the neutral RL task, all participants except for one
4
 performed better than chance 2 
in the acquisition and reversal phases (Table 1). We found no significant correlations between 3 
the levels of depressive symptoms and the choice frequency of the “B” option (|r|s < .22, for 4 
the acquisition and reversal phases) and the model-based learning parameters (|r|s < .11, for 5 
αB, αA,, and β). These results suggest that individual differences in depressive symptoms do not 6 
significantly affect performance in the neutral RL task.  7 
Next, we performed a regression analysis, in which depressive symptoms were 8 
predicted by all the six learning parameters from the emotional and neutral RL tasks. Some of 9 
the learning parameters were moderately correlated with each other (r = .58, for αneg and αpos; 10 
r = . 52, for αB and αA); therefore, the unique association between depressive symptoms and 11 
the learning rate of negative self-reference needs to be tested after controlling for the 12 
inter-parameter correlations. The results (Table 3, Model 1) revealed that the learning rate of 13 
negative self-reference remained a significant predictor, whereas other learning parameters 14 
did not have significant effects on depressive symptoms. These results suggest that the 15 
difficulty in updating outcome predictions is more outspoken for negative self-reference than 16 
for positive and neutral stimuli. 17 
 Finally, we examined the mediational role of the applicability of self-attributes in the 18 
relationship between the low learning rate of negative self-reference and depressive symptoms. 19 
Because the low learning rate of negative self-reference increases the chance to be confronted 20 
with negative aspects of self, it would reinforce one’s negative self-view and be further 21 
associated with depressive symptoms. To test this possibility, we first calculated correlations 22 
between the learning rate of negative self-reference and the average rating scores 23 
(applicability) of negative and positive self-attributes. The learning rate of negative 24 
                                                   
4 This participant had 82.5% and 52.5% of “B” choices in the acquisition and reversal phases, respectively. 
However, results remained unchanged after eliminating the data pertaining to this participant. 
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self-reference had a marginally significant correlation with the applicability of negative (r = 1 
-.27, p = .09) but not positive self-attributes (r = .08, p = .64). Second, we estimated a 2 
regression model similar to Model 1, in which the applicability of negative and positive 3 
self-attributes were added to predict depressive symptoms. The results (Table 3, Model 2) 4 
showed that the applicability of negative self-attributes was the only significant predictor, 5 
which deprived the explanatory power of the learning rate of negative self-reference. The 6 
indirect effect (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), which was calculated by 7 
multiplying (a) the effect of the learning rate of negative self-reference on the applicability of 8 
negative self-attributes and (b) the effect of the applicability of negative self-attributes on 9 
depressive symptoms, was -.385 (p = .097; 95% CI [-.972, .079] estimated by bootstrapping 10 
of 1000-time resampling). Although the indirect effect was only marginally significant, this 11 
result suggests that self-verification can at least in part explain the delayed update of the 12 
prediction outcome of negative self-reference in individuals with depressive symptoms.  13 
Discussion 14 
Study 1 examined the individual differences of depressive symptoms in 15 
reward-guided learning of emotional self-reference. In the baseline task, individuals with 16 
higher levels of depressive symptoms showed a greater preference for negative self-reference, 17 
which replicates the findings of previous studies that suggested excessive negativity bias and 18 
a lack of positivity bias in depression (e.g., Mezulis et al., 2004). Regardless of these 19 
differences in the baseline preference, all individuals successfully learned the association 20 
between positive self-reference and rewards after the reversal of the stimulus-reward 21 
contingencies in terms of the choice frequency of negative self-reference. However, as we 22 
hypothesized, individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms had lower learning rates 23 
of negative self-reference, implying that those individuals have difficulty adjusting their 24 
outcome predictions of negative self-reference to the volatility of the action-outcome 25 
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contingencies.  1 
We also found a correlation (although only marginally significant) between the 2 
learning rate of negative self-reference and the applicability of negative self-attributes. 3 
Furthermore, the applicability of negative self-attributes had a mediating role (again 4 
marginally significant) in the association between impaired updating and depressive 5 
symptoms; that is, people with difficulty in updating the reward prediction of negative 6 
self-reference also tended to have negative self-views and, at the same time, tended to suffer 7 
from increased depressive symptoms. This mediation could be interpreted as indicating that a 8 
low learning rate increases the chance to be exposed to negative self-affirmative information. 9 
This could, on its turn, reinforce negative self-views and lead to depressive symptoms (e.g., 10 
Evraire & Dozois, 2011). However, it should be noted that the small sample size of Study 1 11 
may have limited the power to detect the statistical significance for this mediation.  12 
One important limitation of Study 1 was that the stimulus-reward contingencies were 13 
changed only once across the trials. Therefore, the emotional RL task could not fully capture 14 
the process in which participants, particularly those with higher levels of depressive 15 
symptoms, increase the reward expectancy of negative self-reference. Since individuals with 16 
higher levels of depressive symptoms had greater preference for negative self-reference in the 17 
baseline task, they mostly chose negative self-reference in the first trial of the emotional RL 18 
task. These individuals did not need to newly learn and establish the association between 19 
negative self-reference and rewards in the acquisition phase. Thus, it is possible that the 20 
learning parameters estimated in Study 1 might not reflect the process of learning the 21 
association between negative self-reference and reward. 22 
Study 2 23 
In order to overcome the just mentioned limitation of Study 1, we modified the 24 
emotional RL task by adding a second reversal phase, wherein negative self-reference is more 25 
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associated with reward than with punishment, and positive self-reference is more associated 1 
with punishment than with reward (Figure 2B). In this setting, all participants had to learn (a) 2 
the association between positive self-reference and reward in the first reversal phase, and (b) 3 
the association between negative self-reference and reward in the second reversal phase. The 4 
initial choice in each reversal phase is determined by the learned contingencies in the previous 5 
phase (e.g., the first choice in the second reversal phase should be “positive,” which was 6 
reinforced in the first reversal phase); therefore, we could examine the process of shifting 7 
from positive to negative self-reference independent of the preference that the participants 8 
originally exhibited. In line with the results of Study 1, we predicted that individuals with 9 
higher levels of depressive symptoms would have lower learning rates (i.e., slower value 10 
update) for negative self-reference.  11 
Method 12 
Participants and procedures. Forty-four participants (23 men and 21 women; mean 13 
age = 19.4 years, SD = 1.2 years) were recruited from a large sample pool of undergraduate 14 
students from the University of Tokyo. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 15 
Experiment 1 except for the reinforcement schedule in the RL tasks (Figure 2): the first 16 
one-third of the trials (26 trials) were the acquisition phase, in which the “negative” option 17 
was associated with 80 % of reward and 20 % of punishment; the second one-third of the 18 
trials were the first reversal phase, in which the “negative” option was associated with 20 % 19 
of reward and 80 % of punishment; and the last one-third of the trials were the second 20 
reversal phase, in which the “negative” option was again associated with 80:20% of reward 21 
and punishment. Therefore, the stimulus-reward contingencies were reversed twice across the 22 
78 trials. All participants completed the baseline task without reward/punishment feedback 23 
(20 trials), following which they completed the emotional and neutral RL tasks in a 24 
counterbalanced order. It is to be noted that the learning parameters (learning rates and 25 
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exploitation parameter) were not influenced by the task order, ts < 1.50, ps > .14. The mean 1 
CES-D score was 12.8 (SD = 8.5) and the Cronbach’s alpha was .86. Fourteen participants 2 
showed a level of symptoms above the clinical cutoff (> 15) of the CES-D.  3 
Results and Discussion 4 
In the baseline task, individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms chose 5 
negative self-reference more frequently (r = .44, p < .01), which indicates that those 6 
individuals had greater preference for negative self-reference before engaging in the learning 7 
tasks. Furthermore, they rated the negative attributes to be more applicable (rs = .70 and .69, 8 
p < .01, in the baseline and emotional RL tasks, respectively) and the positive attributes to be 9 
less applicable to themselves (rs = -.51 and -.59, p < .01 in the baseline and emotional RL 10 
tasks, respectively). 11 
In the emotional RL task, all except for three participants
5
 performed better than 12 
chance in the acquisition, first reversal, and second reversal phases (Table 2). Similar to Study 13 
1, we examined the frequency of the “not at all” responses in the self-applicability rating, 14 
which was only 9.5 % in Study 2. This result suggests that in most trials, participants 15 
endorsed the aspects of the self that correspond to the presented rating stimuli.  16 
Regardless of the differences in the choice frequency between Experiment 1 and 2, 17 
the model-based analyses replicated the associations between depressive symptoms and 18 
learning parameters. We used the same Q-learning model as in Study 1, in order to estimate 19 
the learning rates and exploitation parameters (i.e., αneg, αpos, and β). As we hypothesized, the 20 
learning rate of negative self-reference was the only parameter that was significantly 21 
correlated with depressive symptoms (Figure 5). To visualize the choice behaviors and 22 
outcome predictions across trials, we plotted the average choice frequency of negative 23 
self-reference and mean Qneg values for individuals with lower and higher learning rates of 24 
                                                   
5
 Results remained unchanged after excluding the data of these participants. Similarly, in the neutral RL 
task, six participants failed to exceed a chance level. These data did not influence the results. 
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negative self-reference (Figure 6). The lower learning rate of negative self-reference was 1 
associated with slower update of the outcome predictions of negative self-reference
6
. 2 
In the neutral RL task, most of the participants performed better than chance in all the 3 
three learning phases, although six participants failed to exceed a chance level either in the 4 
acquisition or in the first reversal phase. Similar to the results of Experiment 1, none of the 5 
choice frequency (|r|s < .24, ps > .12) and learning parameters (|r|s < .08, ps > .60) were 6 
significantly correlated with depressive symptoms. These null correlations suggest that 7 
individual differences in depressive symptoms did not significantly affect the learning process 8 
for the neutral stimuli. 9 
We also performed a regression analysis predicting depressive symptoms by the six 10 
learning parameters of the emotional and neutral RL tasks to control the inter-parameter 11 
correlations (Table 4, Model 1). The results showed that the learning rate of negative 12 
self-reference was the only significant predictor of depressive symptoms. These results 13 
replicate and extend the findings from Study 1, suggesting that depressive symptoms are 14 
associated with delayed update of outcome predictions of negative self-reference, even when 15 
the task included a second reversal phase that required shifting from positive to negative 16 
self-reference. 17 
Finally, we tested the mediational effects of the applicability of negative and positive 18 
self-attributes on the relationship between the low learning rate of negative self-reference and 19 
depressive symptoms. We found significant correlations between the learning rate of negative 20 
                                                   
6 The low αneg value was also associated with delayed update of the outcome predictions of negative 
self-reference in the second reversal phase. However, this delay did not appear to influence the choice 
behavior itself (Figure 5 A), because the re-learning process after the second contingency reversal is mainly 
controlled by the learning rate of positive, instead of negative self-reference. In several initial trials of the 
second reversal phase, participants mostly continued to select the positive option as it had been associated 
with rewards in the first reversal phase. Thus, the outcome prediction is more frequently updated for the 
positive than negative option under the current Q-learning model assumption (the outcome prediction is 
updated only for the chosen option); in other words, the choice behaviors in the second reversal phase are  
dominantly influenced by the increase in reward prediction for the positive option. Our results showed that 
the learning rate of the positive option is not associated with depressive symptoms; therefore, the process of 
re-learning the association between positive self-reference and reward should not be altered even in 
individuals with high levels of depressive symptoms. 
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self-reference and the average rating scores (applicability) of the negative (r = -.35, p = .02) 1 
and positive self-attributes (r = .30, p = .04). An additional regression analysis revealed that 2 
the applicability of the negative and positive self-attributes were significant predictors of 3 
depressive symptoms, which reduced the explanatory power of the learning rate of negative 4 
self-reference to a non-significant level (Table 4, Model 2). The indirect effect of the learning 5 
rate of negative self-reference on depressive symptoms was -.527 (p = .035; 95%CI [-1.493, 6 
-.152], estimated by bootstrapping of 1000-time resampling) mediated by negative 7 
self-attributes, and -.267 (p = .109; 95%CI[-.860, -.016]) mediated by positive self-attributes
7
. 8 
These results suggest the mediational role of a negative self-image in the association between 9 
the low learning rate and depressive symptoms; that is, people with updating difficulties seem 10 
to be faced with negative self-affirmative information, which may lead to negative self-image 11 
and depressive symptoms. 12 
General Discussion 13 
The present research provides empirical evidence for the learning hypothesis of the 14 
self-negativity bias in depression, stating that individuals with depressive symptoms have 15 
difficulty in adjusting their outcome predictions of negative self-reference to the volatility of 16 
the environment. The two studies consistently showed a significant correlation between 17 
depressive symptoms and a low learning rate of negative self-reference, which represents a 18 
significant delay in updating the outcome predictions of negative self-reference after the 19 
reversal of stimulus-reward contingencies. Our findings shed new light on the possible 20 
learning mechanism underlying the self-negativity bias in individuals with depressive 21 
symptoms. Existing theories and research have exclusively focused on dysfunctions in 22 
attention and (working) memory, suggesting that depressive cognitions can be characterized 23 
by impaired attentional disengagement from and impoverished inhibitory control of negative 24 
                                                   
7
 These mediation effects are estimated in a single model with multiple mediators (i.e., the negative and 
positive self-applicability ratings). 
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self-referent information processing (e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). This cognitive account 1 
of depression provides a good theoretical basis, explaining why it is difficult for depressed 2 
people to stop negative thinking once it has started. However, until now, it was still unclear 3 
why those individuals voluntarily engaged in and often preferred negative to positive 4 
self-reference even when it brings harmful consequences (Coyne, 1976; Giesler et al., 1996; 5 
Swann et al., 1992). In the present studies, we showed that individuals with depressive 6 
symptoms are inflexible in updating and adjusting their outcome predictions of negative 7 
self-reference in a volatile environment in which the outcome of negative self-reference is 8 
variable over time. This result implies that those individuals tend to keep a high 9 
reward-expectancy for negative self-reference even after the reversal of the actual 10 
action-outcome contingencies, which support the persistent belief that negative self-reference 11 
is more rewarding (and more preferred) than positive self-reference. 12 
The difficulty in updating outcome predictions of negative self-reference was 13 
associated with the extent to which one possesses negative self-images. Both Study 1 and 2 14 
showed (marginally) significant negative correlations between the learning rate of negative 15 
self-reference and the applicability of negative self-attributes. Follow-up mediation analyses 16 
(particularly in Study 2) indicated an indirect effect of the low learning rate on depressive 17 
symptoms via negative self-attributes. The low learning rate of negative self-reference 18 
increases the chance to be faced with negative aspects of self, which may result in depressive 19 
symptoms. However, it could also be the other way around. More precisely, people with 20 
depressive symptoms may have a higher motivation to persist in approaching negative 21 
self-referent information and therefore refrain from updating on the basis of reward 22 
predictions. The self-verification theory of depression indeed holds that confirmation of one’s 23 
self-image promotes a sense of self-coherence and fosters the perception that one is true to 24 
oneself (Giesler et al., 1996; Swann et al., 1992). In line with these arguments, a recent study 25 
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showed that individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms have greater preference 1 
toward negative self-reference; conversely, those with lower levels of depressive symptoms 2 
tend to avoid negative self-reference even though they lose an opportunity to obtain a 3 
monetary reward by doing so (Takano et al., 2015). Facing non-self-affirmative information 4 
would be a relatively aversive experience that arouses a sense of self-discrepancy and triggers 5 
an avoidance reaction, for example, when individuals with depressive symptoms have to rate 6 
positive attributes (e.g., “Happy”) as being “not applicable to me.” Thus, it is possible that 7 
rating self-attributes per se would be an extra reward and/or extra punishment, by confirming 8 
negative and disconfirming positive self-images for individuals with depressive symptoms (cf. 9 
Watson, Dritschel, Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008). It is, however, important to note that we 10 
relied on a cross-sectional design in both studies. We therefore cannot specify the causal 11 
directions of the detected mediation
8
. Also note that some effects included in the mediation 12 
were only marginally significant (e.g., the indirect effect of the learning rate in Study 1). 13 
Replication and extension are thus needed with more rigorous (e.g., longitudinal) designs to 14 
establish the mediational association. 15 
The avoidance mechanism is worth mentioning here for another reason. In our task, 16 
participants could avoid positive self-reference by choosing negative self-reference. In this 17 
respect, it is of special interest that the Q-learning model assumes that the outcome prediction 18 
of an unchosen option is not updated, which means that avoiding positive self-reference 19 
maintains low levels of reward expectancy of positive self-reference (however, see e.g., 20 
Schlagenhauf et al., 2013, for variants of the Q-learning model). This might be a good 21 
analogy to the avoidance mechanisms at play in depression (e.g., Jacobson et al., 2001; 22 
Ramnerö et al., 2015): Inactivity and avoidance in depression are argued to reduce the 23 
                                                   
8
 We also tested a “feedback” model with the reversed path direction, i.e. depressive symptoms -> negative 
self-attributes -> the learning rate. Here the indirect effect was -0.01 (p = .88, 95%CI[-0.14, 0.11]) in Study 
1 and -0.05 (p = .26, 95%CI[-0.16, 0.04]) in Study 2. These null effects suggest that our hypothesized 
mediational association (i.e. the learning rate -> negative self-attributes -> depressive symptoms) fits the 
data better than the alternative mediation with the opposite direction. 
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opportunity to experience circumstances that would lead to environmental rewards and 1 
reinforcement (also see Footnote 5). 2 
It is worth noting that, across the two studies, we found no significant association 3 
between depressive symptoms and the learning rate for positive self-reference
9
. This null 4 
association suggests that the reward-guided learning of positive self-reference may not be 5 
disturbed in individuals with depressive symptoms, and thus, that those individuals can come 6 
to choose positive instead of negative self-reference given a high enough number of 7 
reinforced trials. This valence-specific effect should be interpreted with caution though. First, 8 
one might argue that a single (but not double) learning rate would be sufficient to describe the 9 
participants choice behavior (see model comparison section) and that the current results can 10 
be attributed to a general deficit in the updating function that is not specific for negative 11 
self-reference. However, the following arguments go against this criticism: (a) the model with 12 
a single learning rate is nested in the model with two learning rates, so if the single learning 13 
rate would have provided a more appropriate fit for a given participant, the estimates for the 14 
two learning rates should have been more or less equal as in the two-learning-rate model; (b) 15 
if a general deficit is at play, both the learning rates for the negative and positive response 16 
options should have been correlated with depressive symptoms. Second, one may argue that 17 
the lack of a control condition in which the positive response option is initially reinforced 18 
could be considered to give room to the alternative interpretation that depressive symptoms 19 
are associated with a difficulty in updating the reward predictions for the initially learned 20 
response, but not for negative self-reference per se. However, our data of the neutral task with 21 
the non-emotional and non-self-referent stimuli suggests that this is not the case. Still, it 22 
would be important to examine this alternative interpretation more directly by including this 23 
                                                   
9
 As additional evidence, we found that depressive symptoms are significantly correlated with a difference 
score between the negative and positive learning rates in the pooled data of Study 1 and 2 (r = -.24, p 
= .027). This significant correlation suggests that depressive symptoms are associated with a large delay in 
updating outcome predictions for negative relative to positive responses.  
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control condition in follow-up research.  1 
Making abstraction of these alternative interpretations, our findings on the valence 2 
specificity could have important implications for recent cognitive-bias-modification (CBM) 3 
approaches, which aim to alleviate depressive symptoms by correcting negative attentional 4 
and interpretational biases (e.g., Hertel & Mathews, 2011). Although the efficacy of CBM 5 
interventions is still controversial (Beard, Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Cristea, Kok, & 6 
Cuijpers, 2015; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011), our data highlight the 7 
potential of reward-guided reinforcement learning as a novel method to correct self-negativity 8 
bias and to enhance self-positivity bias in depression (cf. Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Lau 2013). 9 
Future research could focus on how to consolidate the learned association between positive 10 
self-reference and reward, because that association appeared relatively fragile in the present 11 
study (cf. the second reversal phase in Study 2). 12 
It is tempting to consider the current results as an indication that negative 13 
self-referent thinking is a mental habit in depression, as discussed in the literature on 14 
depressive rumination (Hertel, 2004; Ramnerö et al., 2015; Verplanken, Friborg Wang, 15 
Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). Indeed, our results showed 16 
that participants with high levels of depressive symptoms continue to select negative 17 
self-reference even after the contingency reversal. This result appears to be consistent with the 18 
hypothesized “habitual” nature of depressive rumination, which is characterized by the 19 
difficulty to oppose depressive rumination despite its negative outcomes (Hertel, 2004). 20 
However, we should be careful to interpret the current results as evidence for the habitual 21 
nature of rumination because of two reasons. First, on a conceptual level, depressive thinking 22 
or rumination is still different from choosing a “negative” option in a decision-making task. 23 
Second, to conclude that a behavior is a habit (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Heyes & Dickinson, 24 
1990), researchers need to test the behavior under conditions of (a) contingency degradation 25 
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(i.e., belief criterion) and (b) outcome devaluation (i.e., desire criterion). Although the 1 
emotional RL task taps into the belief criterion, it does not examine whether negative 2 
self-reference in depression meets the desire criterion, that is, whether participants continue 3 
the reinforced response after outcome devaluation by, for example, saturation (Valentin, 4 
Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007) or instructed devaluation (de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & 5 
Dickinson, 2007). 6 
Even if negative self-reference would be a habit-like behavior that is no longer 7 
driven by the goal or desired outcome that initially installed it, it might still be changed by 8 
identifying and manipulating “hidden goals.” Moors, Boddez, and De Houwer (in press) have 9 
indeed proposed that a single action may have multiple outcomes. In our experiments, one 10 
and the same response option (or action) might have had two goals; one obvious goal was to 11 
obtain monetary rewards, whereas another hidden goal might have been to be consistent with 12 
negative or positive self-views. In the first reversal phase, people with depressive symptoms, 13 
who tend to have negative self-views, might have experienced a conflict between these two 14 
goals, i.e., earning money but being exposed to positive self-images. Our findings could be 15 
taken as evidence that the latter hidden goal weakens the reinforcement for the “positive” 16 
response for those individuals. Therefore, we can expect that identifying and changing the 17 
hidden goal, or manipulating the negative self-views (e.g., Serrano, Latorre, Gatz, & 18 
Montanes, 2004), would be therapeutically beneficial, because engaging in negative 19 
self-referent thinking would no longer satisfy this hidden goal of being consistent with 20 
negative self-views. Watkins and Nolen-Hoeksema (2014) also proposed an intervention to 21 
reduce rumination as a mental habit, which involves the repeated practice of using alternative 22 
coping strategies in response to an identified habit-triggering context (e.g., when lying in 23 
bed). 24 
It is also important to note that we did not find any significant associations between 25 
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depressive symptoms and the learning parameters of the neutral RL task. Previous studies 1 
using the neutral RL task have suggested aberrant reward-punishment sensitivity in clinical 2 
levels of depression (Dombrovski et al., 2010; Murphy, Michael, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2003; 3 
Robinson, Cools, Carlisi, Sahakian, & Drevets, 2012; Taylor Tavares, et al., 2008), implying 4 
that patients with depression shift from one to the other option more often than do healthy 5 
controls when receiving probabilistic negative feedback (i.e., punishment after a correct 6 
response) or when receiving unexpected reward. One critical difference between the previous 7 
and current studies is that our sample consisted of non-clinical university students. In our data, 8 
around 30% of participants showed a level of depressive symptoms above the clinical cutoff 9 
of the CES-D (> 15), which is comparable to the general prevalence rate in university students 10 
(i.e., 30.6%, Ibrahim, Kelly, Adams, & Glazebrook, 2013). Given the continuity of depression 11 
between clinical and non-clinical samples (Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997), we would 12 
argue that our results provide a solid basis for linear predictions for more severe levels of 13 
depression. However, the absolute number of participants who were at a clinical level of 14 
depressive symptoms was relatively small in the current sample (24 participants across two 15 
studies). Therefore, future research should confirm this assertion in a sample of clinically 16 
depressed people. 17 
Another remaining question (particularly of Study 2) is why depressive symptoms 18 
are associated with a delay in re-learning that negative self-reference is rewarded and not only 19 
punished. Our results (see Figure 6B, the second reversal phase) seem to indicate that it takes 20 
a relatively long time for people with depressive symptoms to acquire a preference toward 21 
negative self-reference
10
, which might reflect a blunted sensitivity to external reward and 22 
punishment in updating belief about negative self-reference. However, it should be noted that 23 
                                                   
10
 Note that in the acquisition phase (before any contingency reversal), people with higher levels of 
depressive symptoms had already shown greater preference toward the negative option (see also the results 
of the baseline tasks). These individuals did not need to newly “learn” the association between negative 
self-reference and rewards in the acquisition phase. 
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the delay that we observed here might be merely due to the model assumption that the 1 
learning rate had to be equal between rewarded and punished trials. This constraint was 2 
installed because a model with four learning rates (i.e., negative and positive/rewarded and 3 
punished trials) had too many free parameters (leading to a convergence issue). Since some 4 
studies have suggested that the learning rate can be different between rewarded and punished 5 
trials (e.g., Dombrovski et al., 2009), future research needs to dissociate the four different 6 
updating processes (i.e., rewarded versus punished and negative versus positive 7 
self-reference) to specify which delay best models depression. This could be achieved by 8 
estimating a model with learning rates for rewarded and punished trials in an experiment with 9 
two between-person conditions: a condition with a negative-to-positive (i.e., learning that the 10 
negative is punished and the positive is rewarded after the contingency reversal) and 11 
condition with a positive-to-negative transition (i.e., learning that the positive is punished, and 12 
the negative is rewarded after the contingency reversal). 13 
In conclusion, the present research is the first to provide evidence that individuals 14 
with depressive symptoms have difficulty updating their outcome predictions of negative 15 
self-reference in a volatile environment. This inflexibility in updating outcome predictions 16 
could contribute to excessive focus on negative aspects of the self, that is, to self-negativity 17 
bias in depression. Furthermore, the difficulty in updating the reward prediction of negative 18 
self-reference is correlated with the negative self-image that individuals with depressive 19 
symptoms often possess. The consistency between their negative self-images and negative 20 
self-reference (and discrepancy between their negative self-image and positive self-reference) 21 
may be associated with the delayed shift from negative to positive self-reference. We believe 22 
that the reinforcement learning and model-based approach could be a promising starting point 23 
to reveal the mechanisms of the persistence and repetitiveness of depressive cognitions.  24 
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Table 1 1 
Mean Negative Log Likelihood and AIC across Participants for the Single and Double 2 
Update Models 3 
 Negative Log 
likelihood 
AIC N of participants with AIC 
as Double < Single 
 Double Single Double Single (N / total sample size) 
Study 1 21.14 22.00 48.28 48.00 12 / 39 
Study 2 23.02 24.00 52.03 51.98 13 / 44 
Note. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion.  4 
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Table 2. 
Means and SDs of Choice Frequencies of Negative Self-reference and Learning Parameters in 
the Baseline, Emotional, and Neutral Reversal Learning (RL) Tasks for Study 1 and 2 
 Study 1 
(n = 39) 
Study 2 
(n = 44) 
M SD M SD 
Baseline task—choice frequency 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.24 
Emotional RL task     
 Choice frequency     
   Acquisition 0.81 0.11 0.78 0.15 
   First reversal 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.12 
   Second reversal - - 0.78 0.11 
 Learning rate—negative (αneg) 0.60  0.28  0.70  0.26  
 Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.58  0.30  0.71  0.24  
 Exploitation (β) 12.06  11.26  8.33  8.20  
Neutral RL task     
 Choice frequency     
   Acquisition 0.77 0.14 0.79 0.16 
   First reversal 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.15 
   Second reversal - - 0.79 0.14 
Learning rate—B (αB) 0.69  0.28  0.74  0.23  
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.52  0.30  0.66  0.30  
Exploitation (β) 11.60  11.75  15.53  13.09  
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Table 3 
Multiple Regressions Predicting the Severity of Depressive Symptoms (log-transformed) by 
Learning Parameters of the Emotional and Neutral Reversal Learning (RL) Tasks (Model 1) 
and Rating Scores of Self-attributes (Model 2) in Study 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Β 95% CI p Β 95% CI p 
Emotional RL task       
 Learning rate—negative (αneg) -1.03  [-1.97, -0.08] .03  -0.58  [-1.37,0.20] .14 
 Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.45  [-0.39, 1.30] .28  0.14  [-0.55,0.84] .68 
 Exploitation (β) -0.01  [-0.03, 0.01] .43  0.00  [-0.02, 0.02] .91 
Neutral RL task       
Learning rate—B (αB) -0.36  [-1.21, 0.50] .41  -0.25  [-0.95, 0.46] .48 
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.06  [-0.79, 0.91] .88  0.22  [-0.47, 0.91] .52 
Exploitation (β) 0.01  [-0.01, 0.03] .27  0.00  [-0.01, 0.02] .78 
Applicability ratings       
Negative self-attributes - - - 0.67  [0.29, 1.05] <.01 
Positive self-attributes - - - -0.05  [-0.43, 0.33] .80 
R
2
 .22 .53 
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Table 4 
Multiple Regressions Predicting the Severity of Depressive Symptoms (log-transformed) by 
Learning Parameters of the Emotional and Neutral Reversal Learning (RL) Tasks (Model 1) 
and Rating Scores of Self-attributes (Model 2) in Study 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Β 95% CI p Β 95% CI p 
Emotional RL task       
 Learning rate—negative (αneg) -1.43  [-2.78, -0.09] .04  -0.44  [-1.46, 0.58 .39 
 Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.41  [-0.97, 1.79] .55  0.30  [-0.70, 1.3] .55 
 Exploitation (β) 0.00  [-0.02, 0.03] .74  0.01  [-0.02, 0.03] .62 
Neutral RL task       
Learning rate—B (αB) -0.25  [-1.15, 0.65] .58  -0.48  [-1.13, 0.17] .14 
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.99  [-0.36, 2.34] .14  0.70  [-0.27, 1.67] .15 
Exploitation (β) -0.01  [-0.03, 0.02] .63  0.00  [-0.02, 0.01] .55 
Ratings       
Negative self-attributes - - - 0.70  [0.34, 1.06] <.01 
Positive self-attributes - - - -0.40  [-0.75, -0.06] .02 
R
2
 .15 .59 
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Figure 1. Schematic flow of a single trial in the baseline (A), emotional (B) and neutral (C) 
reversal learning tasks. 
In each experiment, the participants performed the baseline task (Panel A), in which they 
selected the preferred valence (“negative” vs. “positive”) for the following self-referent rating 
[e.g., Questions such as “Happy?” (or “Unhappy?”) were displayed if the “positive” (or 
“negative”) option were selected]. In the emotional reversal learning task (Panel B), 
participants selected the preferred valence for the following self-referent rating and, 
subsequently, monetary reward (+5 JPY) or punishment (-5 JPY) was presented 
probabilistically, depending on the participants’ valence choices. The reinforcement schedules 
have been presented in Figure 2. In the neutral reversal learning task (Panel C), the 
participants choose between the letters “A” and “B”, which was rewarded or punished 
according to the same reinforcement schedule used in the emotional RL task. JPY = Japanese 
yen. 
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Figure 2. Reward and punishment schedules of Experiments 1 and 2.  
In Study 1 (Panel A), participants were trained to choose negative self-reference in the first 
half of the trials, following which they were prompted to shift toward positive self-reference 
in the reversal phase. In Study 2, the contingency reversal took place twice to train the 
participants to select negative, positive, and negative self-reference. The reward/punishment 
probabilities were opposite for the “positive” and “A” options (e.g., 20:80 in the acquisition 
phase). 
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Figure 3. Correlations between depressive symptoms and the learning rates of negative (Panel 
A) and positive self-reference (Panel B), and the exploitation parameter (Panel C) in Study 1.  
The depressive symptoms score (the CES-D score) was log transformed. 
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Figure 4. Frequency of negative choice and average outcome predictions of negative 
self-reference in Study 1.  
Panel A illustrates the average choice frequencies of negative self-reference for individuals 
from the upper (red) and lower quartiles (blue) of the learning rate of negative self-reference 
(i.e., αneg). Panels B shows the average outcome predictions of negative self-reference (Qneg) 
for the same individuals (standard errors are shown in the grey field).  
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Figure 5. Correlations between depressive symptoms and the learning rate of negative (Panel 
A) and positive self-reference (Panel B), and the exploitation parameter (Panel C) in Study 2.  
The depressive symptoms score (the CES-D score) was log transformed. 
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Figure 6. Frequency of negative choice and average outcome predictions of negative 
self-reference in Study 2.  
Panel A presents the average choice frequencies of negative self-reference for individuals 
from the upper (red) and lower quartiles (blue) of the learning rate of negative self-reference 
(i.e., αneg). Panels B shows the outcome predictions of negative self-reference (Qneg) for the 
same individuals (standard errors are shown in the grey field). 
 
